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Abstract
We estimate structural quantile treatment effects to analyze the relationship between household
income and sorting into private or public education, using Italian data. Public education provision
is redistributive when rich families, who contribute to its financing, find it optimal to sort out of
the public system to buy the educational services in the private market. This may occur when the
education quality is lower in the public compared to the private sector, meaning that households
with higher income capacity face lower opportunity costs from sorting out of the public system. We
exploit heterogeneity in expected tax deductions to exogenously manipulate the distribution of net
of taxes income, equalized by family needs, and explore the consequences of this manipulation on
various quantiles of the distribution of the amount of the educational transfers in-kind accruing to
the households, valuing public education. We find that an increase in income reduces the amount
of educational transfers in-kind (i) more for higher quantiles of the educational transfers in-kind,
indicating that households with higher preferences for quality sort out of the public education system;
(ii) more for lower quantiles of the households’ income capacity, indicating that richer households
receive lower transfers for a given preference quality.
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1 Introduction
In many countries public education provision and free accessibility to compulsory education
are fundamental constitutional rights. As largely recognized, public education provision
accounts, together with health care, for a substantial share of the public budget in coun-
tries with developed welfare states. Several reasons justify this spending: among them, a
redistributive motive (Aaberge, Langorgen and Lindgren 2013). This paper aims at test-
ing one of the mechanisms behind the redistributiveness of public education provision by
analyzing the sorting process into public and private education among Italian households.
Public education provision is redistributive as far as more affluent families with children
in education find it optimal to sort out of the public system, while contributing to its
financing, and buy the educational services in the private market. Different reasons may
justify why families choose private schools, such as the support of common values as religion
(Sander 2001) and status symbol (Fershtman, Murphy and Weiss 1996). There is a long
tradition within the human capital investment models (see for instance Stiglitz 1974) in
claiming that the schooling quality is higher in the private compared to the public sector.
Since quality is a normal good, rich households are willing to buy an higher amount of
quality, and consequently may opt out for private education even if having to pay for it.1
This paper contributes with an innovative empirical analysis that allows to test the
mechanism suggested by Besley and Coate (1991), according to which it is the interplay
between family income and preferences for quality that delimits the extent of the house-
holds sorting into public and private education. This mechanism motivates a government,
aiming at redistributing resources from rich to poor households, to use universal pub-
lic education provision as transfers in-kind in presence of asymmetric information on the
households’ income capacity. The literature that analyses the role of public education
provision (educational transfers in-kind) calls this sorting process into private and public
education self-targeting (Currie and Gahvari 2008).
According to the Besley and Coate mechanism, the policymaker with redistributive
intents imposes costs to the families opting for almost free public education, that take the
form of restrictions on the quality of the public educational service. These costs deter
the rich households from mimicking the poor ones, thus acting as a separation device.
The lower is the quality, the larger is the incentive for the households with higher income
capacity to sort out of the public education system while continuing to finance it, which
makes the educational transfers in-kind progressive in nature (Besley and Coate 1991,
Blackorby and Donaldson 1988, Gahvari and Mattos 2007). The quality of public education
should be, however, high enough to insure that low income families are better off when
1Quality can be conceived either as a subjective measure of schools’ quality, such as the score given
by households to the schools in the area of residence, or a more objective measure, linked to observable
indicators such as the student-teacher ratio (Checchi and Jappelli 2003).
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consuming it. This reasoning applies in full only to mandatory education, where families
can decide whether to enroll their children in the public or in the private sector, but
they have no option left for choosing to consume no educational services. Whether the
mechanism also works in post-mandatory education (i.e. for families with children aged
more than 14 years old) is debatable for at least two reasons. First, the household’s self-
selection into both private and public education can be driven by expected returns to
children’s education, that are positively correlated with household income, or by costs of
attending education, that are negatively correlated with income. Second, the quality of
private schooling for upper secondary education is not necessarily higher than the quality
in public schools. This occurs, for instance, in Italy where the demand for upper secondary
private education seems to be driven by a remedial scope for less talented children coming
from rich households (Bertola, Checchi and Oppedisano 2007, Bertola and Checchi 2013).
At the heart of the sorting process into private education described by Besley and Coate
(1991), there is the correlation between the unobservable family specific income capacity
and preference for quality of the educational good. We propose an estimation strategy
based on structural quantile treatment effects (Ma and Koenker (2006)) to investigate the
relationship between household income and preferences for quality and verify the premises
of the self-targeting mechanism. We exploit heterogeneity in expected tax deductions to
exogenously manipulate the prevailing distribution of net of taxes income, equalized by
families needs, and explore the consequences of this manipulation on various quantiles of
the distribution of the amount of educational transfers in-kind.
On the one hand, for a given degree of quality proxied by the quantiles of the distribu-
tion of the educational transfers in-kind, we expect that an increase in household income is
associated with decreasing transfers in-kind that go to the households with higher income
capacity. On the other hand, for a given degree of the household’s income capacity, proxied
by the quantiles of the income distribution, the quality of public schools captured by our
transfers in-kind measure contributes to households sorting into private and public educa-
tion. In this case, the magnitude of the negative relation between household income and
the transfers in-kind received is expected to grow along the distribution of in-kind trans-
fers, since households revealing higher preferences for the quality of educational services
will be ready to devote a larger share of a marginal income gain into private education.
One of the major difficulties in this type of analysis is related to data availability. 2
Our empirical strategy consists in converting the quality of the public education provi-
sion into a monetary counterpart that the family would have to spend to buy the same
quality on the market. This quantity is the monetary equivalent of a transfer in-kind that
the family receives when opting for almost free public education and represents a lower
2Aaberge, Bhuller, Langørgen and Mogstad (2010), for instance, use detailed accounting data of munic-
ipalities as a basis for estimating the need adjusted scale for local public services in Norway.
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bound of the opportunity costs to choose expensive private education. We make use of a
study carried out exclusively in 2003 by the Italian National Institute for the Evaluation
of Education System (INVALSI) and the Consortium for the Development of the Method-
ologies and Innovations of the Public Administrations (MIPA), INVALSI-MIPA (2005),
to microsimulate the educational transfers in-kind accruing to the households. Following
the standard practice, the transfer in-kind accruing to the household equals the average
cost of producing the services that the household’s children in education benefit from. The
main component of this average cost is the teacher-student ratio, hence, our measure of the
educational transfers in-kind partly reflects the objective quality of the public service. We
use SHIW database (wave 2004) by the Bank of Italy to collect the other data of interest,
such as household income, children school attendance and information on the background
of origin of the family. Since SHIW does not provide information on the type of school
(public versus private) attended by children, we weight the per-child educational transfer
in-kind by group-specific probabilities to be enrolled in a public school/university.
Our empirical assessment shows that an increase in income reduces the amount of
educational transfers in-kind (i) more for higher quantiles of the educational transfers
in-kind (ii) more for lower quantiles of the household income capacity. These results
are strengthened when we confine our analysis to compulsory education only, where the
premises of the self-targeting mechanism should apply in full.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the scene illustrating
how income affects the households’ sorting into private-public education according to the
model by Besley and Coate (1991) and how to assess empirically the mechanism of interest.
Section 3 describes the empirical strategy: method, data, the microsimulation exercise on
the educational transfers in-kind, descriptive statistics and our instrument. Results and
the discussion are reported in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Public education provision and in-kind transfers
The mechanism outlined in Besley and Coate (1991) explains how households self-target
into public and private education provision on the basis of two components: preferences for
school quality and income capacity, that is the income potentially earnable by the family
and unobservable to the government. The simple model outlined below allows to identify
the empirical relations that we aim at testing on the data.
2.1 Quality sorting and educational transfers in-kind
Following Besley and Coate (1991) and Gahvari and Mattos (2007), consider an economy
with two types of households, the poor households (with low income yP > 0) and the rich
4
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Figure 1: The economy’s Pareto frontier (AC) and utility feasibility frontier (DB′EF )
with public education provision when kmax > k∗.
households (with high income yR > yP ). These households are endowed with a utility
u(c, k), which depends on the quantity of nume´raire good c and on the quality k of the
indivisible educational good which these households buy for their children. Every unit
of quality is produced with a linear technology and its price on the market is fixed to
p. Assume that educational quality is a normal good and that the educational goods are
supplied at higher quality in the private market compared to the public sector. Universal
public education provision is redistributive when rich households prefer to opt out from
the public (almost free) education system and buy higher quality educational services on
the market, while bearing its cost in full and, at the same time, financing public education.
Figure 1, from Gahvari and Mattos (2007), shows the Pareto frontier AC of this econ-
omy, where education is produced at different quality varieties by the private sector. On
the frontier, the locus B represents the solution without public education provision where
the rich families are better off compared to the poor ones, since they can afford higher
consumption goods and schooling quality.
Consider now a redistributive scheme involving public education, available inexpen-
sively to all households and produced at fixed quality k by the public sector, which is
financed by levying a lump-sum tax T from all families. The feasibility frontier associated
to this scheme is represented by the curve DB′EF in Figure 1.
If the income capacity of households is known, the redistributive scheme implements
the first best allocation. Public education is produced at a quality level k equal to the level
of quality k∗ that would have been chosen by the poor household if she had to buy the
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educational good on the market, but her income was complemented by a positive in-cash
transfer. This transfer lets the poor be indifferent between receiving one extra dollar in
cash and one extra dollar worth of the publicly provided educational good. This condition
identifies the locus E on the graph.
When income capacity is not observable, Besley and Coate (1991) points out that
the choice of k should act as a separation device of poor and rich households into public
and private education, respectively. The Besley-Coate mechanism implements, therefore,
a separating equilibrium where the incentive compatibility constraints of both types of
households are satisfied:
uR(yR − T, k¯) ≤ V R(p, yR − T ) (1a)
uP (yP − T, k¯) ≥ V P (p, yP − T ) (1b)
where u(yi − T, k¯) for i = R,P denotes households’ utility if public education of quality k
is consumed, while V (p, yi − T ) is the indirect utility function of a family buying private
education.
As long as the government chooses a quality level of public education provision k¯ lower
than the level demanded by the rich families (k¯ < k(p, yR − T ) = kmax, corresponding to
point F in the Figure) but higher than the minimum value kmin that satisfies equation (1b)
(corresponding to point D), rich and poor families self-target with respect to participation
to the program, making the overall scheme redistributive. However, governments likely
implement an inefficient allocation solution, thus shifting the costs of self-targeting towards
poorest families.3 Moreover, the incentive compatibility constraint of the rich in equation
(1a) sets the limit on the redistributiveness of the program and for this reason, such schemes
may not necessarily form part of a properly designed redistributive policy. Overall, there is
a trade-off between the cost to the government to minimize the asymmetric information on
the households’ income capacity and the deadweight loss inherent in an inefficient quality
of the public provision of education. Measuring the extent of such trade-off is a demanding
exercise that has an economic meaning only for cases where the premises of the Besley-
Coate mechanism are verified on the data. This case is discussed below.
3Although there is self-selection in taking up the program on the side of the poor households, the
efficient quality of the public provision of education that the poor families would choose for themselves if
they received its value in cash, remains unobservable. Only point E is on the first best frontier corresponding
to this efficient quality level k∗. For all points between D and E, the quality level chosen by the government
is less than efficient, k¯ ≤ k∗, while for all points between E and F the quality level is more than efficient
k¯ ≥ k∗. To account for these inefficiencies, Gahvari and Mattos (2007) show that a combination of cash
(in terms of either a cash rebate or a lump sum tax) and in-kind transfers may allow to achieve first-best
redistribution with self-targeting mechanisms.
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2.2 Empirical assessment of the sorting mechanism
We investigate the impact of household income on the in-kind transfers distribution to
verify if the sorting behavior of the households into private and public education is com-
patible with the mechanism suggested by Besley and Coate (1991). To assess this, we
exploit heterogeneity of the marginal benefits of income across two relevant distributional
dimensions: the household’s income capacity and her preferences for school quality.
For a given degree of quality of public education, proxied by the quantiles of the
distribution of the educational transfers in-kind, household’s income capacity determines
the sorting into private education.
The Besley and Coate (1991) mechanism implies that when the households’ income
capacity is unobservable, restrictions on the quality of the public educational service may
deter rich households from mimicking the poor ones. Together with household income
capacity, quality is, therefore, the other relevant dimension. For a given degree of the
household’s income capacity measured at a finite quantile of the distribution of household
income, the quality of public schools - as measured by our transfers in-kind - may explain
the type of school chosen. As long as households renounce to the quality freely provided
by public schools, they are revealing a preference for the quality of private schools. The
intensity of in-kind transfers reveals information on the households’ preferences for quality.
This is true in distributional terms, since the in-kind transfers distribution represents the
full spectrum of the opportunity costs that the households would have to support when self-
targeting into private education. By using the quantiles of the in-kind transfers distribution
as the dependent variable, we can estimate the marginal benefit of income at fixed levels
of households’ preferences for quality, revealed by the magnitude of the opportunity costs
associated to these quantiles.
Our estimation strategy employs regression analysis of the effect of income on educa-
tional transfers in-kind in a quantile setting. Other works have tested the role of income
on sorting probabilities. For instance, Checchi and Jappelli (2007), using SHIW 1993 data,
provide estimates of the conditional mean probability of enrollment in private schools con-
trolling for income quartiles and indicators of objective and subjective measures of school
quality. Our empirical exercise is different in at least two ways. First, we assess the pref-
erences for quality rather than proxying quality with subjective or objective evaluations.
Second, we single out the marginal effects of income across the two dimensions of interest.
Public education provision meets the Besley-Coate mechanism if households that ben-
efit less from public education are those who, for a given quality level, have an higher
income capacity, and who have higher preferences for quality, for a given income capacity.
We adopt a structural perspective for modeling the correlation between these two sources
of heterogeneity, whose interplay affects households’ sorting behavior.
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3 Empirical strategy
3.1 Structural quantile treatment effect estimation
We apply the control variate approach by Ma and Koenker (2006) to exogenously ma-
nipulate the income distribution and to estimate the structural quantile treatment effects
of exogenous variations of income on the distribution of the transfers in-kind received by
the families. This method allows to measure the extent to which an exogenous change
in household income affects the amount of transfers in kind accruing to the household,
along the distribution of household income capacity and preferences for the quality of the
educational services distributions. To do so, we compare the estimated effects of income
at different degrees of the two forms of heterogeneity.
Consider the quantile functions of the response variables transfers in-kind, denoted
QK , and household income, denoted QY . In what follows, we use capital letters to indicate
distributions, while bold letters refer to either vectors or matrices. We assume that the
two quantile functions are related by the following structural relations:
QK(τK |Y,x, νY (τY )) = gK(Y,x, νY (τY );α(τK , τY ))
QY (τY |z,x) = gY (z,x;β(τY ))
where x are covariates and νY (τY ) is the control variate. In the equations, τY and τK
identify the quantiles of the distributions of income Y and educational transfers in-kind K
while α and β are the structural parameters. In particular, α depicts the marginal effect
of a one euro change in income at fixed quantiles of both income capacity and quality
preferences. The variable z is an instrument for income. It allows to disentangle the
exogenous variations in income from the unobserved components that jointly determine
incomes and transfers in-kind accruing to the household. The analysis is at the household
level and within this paragraph the subscript h is dropped for expositional purposes.
Conditioning on the estimated control variate, whose coefficient can be interpreted as
the degree of endogeneity (i.e. the degree of self-selection) of the income variable, the
parameters of the structural equation solve the following minimization problem:
αˆ(τK , τY ) = argmin
α
n∑
h=1
σK · ρτK (K − gK(Y,x, νˆY (τY );α))
where σK are strictly positive weights and the function ρτK is the check function as in
Koenker and Bassett (1978).
Following Ma and Koenker (2006), we focus on parametric estimation based on a linear
8
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structural model for conditional quantiles of the form:
K = α0 + α1Y + Xh · α2 + Xhh · α3 + Xr · α4 + α5FB1 + α6FB2 + u (2a)
Y = β0 + β1Z + Xh · β2 + Xhh · β3 + Xr · β4 + β5FB1 + β6FB2 + U (2b)
where Xh are household characteristics including the number of earning recipients, dum-
mies for the area of residence of the household and a polynomial of degree one in the cohort
of birth of the first child; Xhh are characteristics of the head of the household including
gender (i.e. if female), age, age squared, years of schooling; Xr are local market conditions
measured by the regional GDP per head and unemployment rate.
The last two covariates, FB1 and FB2, denote the distribution of family background
differential in incomes made conditional on the degree of abilities of the households and
on two background measures (socioeconomic background of the grand-fathers and the
educational background of all grandparents). As shown in appendix B, these variables
are estimated as transformations of the quantiles of the distributions of incomes made
conditional on the background of origin of the observed households. As suggested in
Acemoglu and Pischke (2001), the rank occupied by an household in her family background
group-specific income distribution is close to be a sufficient statistic for her unobservable
abilities, so that we can interpret FB1 and FB2 as proxies for families’ unobservable
characteristics inherited from the background of origin.
We assume a flexible specification of the error term u in equation (2a) where income
is allowed to influence both the location and scale of the educational transfers in-kind
distribution. We also consider the possibility that the location and scale effect might
be heterogeneous across families with different background of origin, while holding their
abilities (identified by their position in the respective income distribution) as fixed. These
considerations lead to formulating the error term in equation (2a) as a linear transformation
of income: u = (λνY + νK+FB1+FB2)(Y ψ + 1) and U = νY , where νK and νY are
independent of one another and i.i.d. over households. The structure of the errors shows
that the unobservable family specific income capacity and preference for quality of the
educational good are indeed correlated, as required by the self targeting mechanism.
Estimation of the model evolves in a two-step procedure. The first step consists in
running a set of quantile regressions of equation (2b) at given quantiles of Y . The set
of estimates β̂ identifies the distribution of νY (τY ) for every reference quantile τY . The
residuals ν̂Y (τY ) estimate the unexplained part of the gap between the income of a given
household and the income quantile, conditional on the covariates. The second step consists
in running a set of quantile regressions of equation (2a) at finite quantiles of K controlling
for the control variate ν̂Y (τY ) estimated at each quantile τY . The estimated effects α̂ vary
therefore in both τK and τY dimensions.
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We investigate these relationships only for a selected number of quantiles corresponding
to 20%, 30%, 50%, 70% and 80% of both the household income capacity and the educational
transfers in-kind distributions. The analysis starts at the 2nd decile because, in the main
sample, households sitting at the first decile of the educational transfers in kind distribution
do not benefit at all of the public spending on education, and for them the outcome variable
is zero.4 For sake of symmetry, we do not consider the last decile, either.
3.2 SHIW Data and sample selection criteria
We make use of the SHIW (Survey on Households Income and Wealth) 2004 wave. SHIW
is a nationally representative household survey conducted in Italy every two years by the
Bank of Italy and gathers information on net incomes, savings and main characteristics of
Italian households.5 Individual data are collapsed into family income, providing a sample
of 8,004 families with positive incomes.
Our sample selection strategy consists in focusing on families who potentially benefit
from public spending on education, namely families with children aged 3 to 23 years old.6
As a result, the sample is reduced to 2,495 households with children born between 1981 and
2001. Out of these families, 271 are dropped because of missing information on either the
grandparental background, that we use as covariate to account for household unobserved
heterogeneity, or on the education level of the head of the family.7
To attenuate the composition effect related to the age of the parents, we further restrict
the estimating sample to households whose head is aged 33 to 60 at the time of the survey
(i.e. individuals born between 1944 and 1971) after dropping the lower and the upper 5%
of the distribution of the age of the head of the family. This last cut shrinks the using
sample to 2,030 households.
To account for scale economies within the household, we equalize household income
using the EU equivalence scale, which employs different scale factors for children and
adults.8
4Quantiles either equal to or higher than the 20th satisfy the requirement that the continuous densities
of the conditional distribution function of the educational transfers in-kind are bounded away from zero
for every conditioning variable in the support.
5Microsimulated gross income data and personal income taxes are kindly provided by C. Fiorio. These
data account for potential tax evasion. For this reason, they constitute a more precise measure of the
income earned by the family.
6In Italy a university degree is obtained conditional on passing a certain number of exams. This number
varies across courses degree. To avoid selection into achievement, we exclude from our working sample
families with children aged more than 23. This age can be conceived, in the majority of cases, the minimum
age required to complete a university course degree.
7Sixteen of these drops only were due to missing information on the level of education of the head of
the family.
8The EU scale assigns a weight equal to 1 to the head of the household; equal to 0.5 to the other
household components, including the spouse and children older than 14 years old, and equal to 0.3 to
children under 14 years old, (see Aaberge et al. 2013).
10
ECINEQ WP 2015 - 356 January 2015
3.3 Public educational services as transfers in-kind: definition and im-
putation rules
The evaluation of educational transfers in-kind is an empirical demanding exercise as in-
kind transfers data availability is very restricted.
We make use of a unique study by INVALSI-MIPA (2005) based on year 2003 data to
compute the educational transfers in-kind monetary equivalent. The value of the educa-
tional transfers in-kind received by each student is equal to the average cost of producing
it, denoted AC(r, e). This cost is allowed to vary across Italian regions r and educational
levels e.9 This monetary value summarizes the information provided by a variety of indica-
tors representing the quality of the schooling inputs. The most relevant of these indicators
is the teacher-pupils ratio, a well known measure of educational quality.
We merge these average costs with the data in SHIW. We treat as recipients of the
transfers all children in the selected household aged between three and five, and those aged
six to 23 who classify themselves as students in the survey. Unfortunately, we do not observe
the type of school (either private or public) attended by the students. Consequently, we
assign to each student the cost of production of the education service he is consuming, and
we let this cost vary according to his region of residence and his educational level. This cost
is then weighted by the probability the student has to benefit of public education, denoted
by ω(g), where g refers to a given household group, thus incorporating the information on
the school selection process from the side of the households. The monetary value of the
expected educational transfer in-kind associated to each child c in family h of type g, who
lives in region r and who is in educational level e is therefore denoted:
kc := ω(g) ·AC(r, e) (3)
To compute ω(g) we use Multiscopo Survey 2005 data from ISTAT. The survey collects
information on the presence of a child enrolled either in a private or in a public school.10
After gathering households in homogeneous groups defined on the basis of a variety of
household characteristics, such as the macro geographical area of residence, age class of
each child, level of education of the parents and occupational conditions of the head of
the family.11 For each group g, we use observed frequencies to determine the probabilities
9Since Italy has 20 regions and 5 educational levels (from kindergarten to tertiary education), we end
up with a 20×5 matrix of average costs of education. For all details about the calculations of these average
costs see appendix A.
10Unfortunately, Multiscopo Survey data do not gather information on households’ income.
11Geographical areas are North West, North East, Centre and South and Islands. Age classes correspond
to the five educational levels: kindergarten (i.e. from 3 to 5), primary education (i.e. from 6 to 10), lower
secondary education (i.e. from 11 to 13), upper secondary education (i.e. from 14 to 18), and tertiary
education (from 19 to 23). Parents’ education is categorized in three levels: low educational level (both
parents with at most lower secondary school degree), high educational level (both parents with upper
secondary school or university degree) and mixed residual category (one parent with a low educational
11
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to enroll a children in public education. We then use these group specific probabilities ωg
to calculate the expected value of the educational transfer in-kind for each children. Two
children in education who live in the same region, attend the same educational level and
come from families in the same class, receive equal expected value of educational transfers
in-kind.12
The transfer in-kind accruing to the household h corresponds to the sum of the transfers
received by each of her children in education, and it is denoted:
kh =
∑
c∈h
kc. (4)
The in-kind transfer accruing to the household depends upon the fertility and timing of
fertility of the families. To achieve comparability among families with different educational
needs, we scale kh by the needs-adjusted equivalence scale (see Aaberge et al. 2013, Aaberge
et al. 2010),13 which allows to calculate the amount of educational transfers in-kind per
equivalent child enrolled at schools.14 All children in post-compulsory schooling age that
do not attend any school are assumed to receive a value of educational transfers in-kind
equal to zero.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
The equivalent (net) income in the working sample from SHIW ranges from 94.8 to more
than 360,000 euro, with an average of 13,164 euro per household. About 80% of families
receive an income between 4,500 and 23,000 euro. The overall educational in-kind transfer
accruing to the households is 3,774 euro on average. The equivalized transfer in-kind ranges
from 371.5 euro if all children are enrolled in tertiary education, up to 2,239 euro if all
children are enrolled in mandatory education. It may be also noted that the variability
of these transfers for compulsory education is considerably higher than those of the other
educational levels.
level while the other with a high educational level). We consider the lower secondary school degree as the
cut-off point since the parents are almost all affected by the 1962 reform which abolished the second track
of the schooling system and made compulsory to all children the attendance of the lower secondary school
at least up to the age of 14. Finally we identify two different occupational conditions of the households’
head: the one (the low-background group) includes unemployed, unskilled manual workers and employees
in the agriculture sector, the other (the high-background group) comprises all other cases.
12For instance, within a region, the expected educational transfers in-kind may take 30 different positive
values, 5 educational level times 6 different probabilities of attending public schools and a zero value for
those in post-compulsory schooling age who choose stop studying.
13The Simplified Needs-Adjusted equivalence scale (SNA) calculated by Aaberge et al. (2013) for year
2006, the closest to year 2004, amounts to assign to all household components other than children a weight
of 0.5, and to each child different weights according to her age: from 3 to 5 years old, 0.3; from 6 to 13,
0.66; from 14 to 23, 0.93.
14Additional robustness checks using household size as equivalent scale confirm our results. Results are
available from the authors upon request.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics.
Mean sd Min Max
Income 13,164.43 12,723.53 94.76 360,002.56
Hh components 3.87 0.91 2.00 9.00
Income recipients 1.77 0.67 1.00 3.00
Prob. enroll. pub. sch. 0.93 0.08 0.51 1.00
Inkind Overall (Euro) 3,773.80 2,009.94 0.00 10,214.27
Inkind Comp. (Euro) 2,238.59 2,463.00 0.00 10,214.27
Inkind Sec. (Euro) 1,067.57 1,559.96 0.00 6,747.55
Inkind Univ. (Euro) 371.53 843.99 0.00 6,806.01
Exp. Max. Tax Deductions 3,926.52 949.91 1,318.83 5,537.73
Children, tot 1.90 0.79 1.00 7.00
Children studying (Comp.) 0.58 0.72 0.00 3.00
Children studying (Sec.) 0.44 0.62 0.00 4.00
Children studying (Univ.) 0.20 0.45 0.00 2.00
Hh head, female 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
Hh education (years) 10.58 3.75 5.00 19.00
Hh head, age 46.08 6.82 33.00 60.00
Family Back. Occ. (Euro) 120.91 7,342.07 -44,247.34 259,669.67
Family Back. Educ. (Euro) -16.03 7,438.38 -47,840.55 258,711.23
Sample Size 2,030
Sources: SHIW, Bank of Italy, wave 2004; microsimulated educational transfers in-kind using INVALSI-
MIPA data, 2003; household gross income and personal income taxes kindly provided by C. Fiorio.
The dashed line in Figure 2 shows the distribution of expected transfers in kind (i.e.,
weighted by the probability of attending public schools) while the solid line in the same
figure reports the distribution of un-weighted transfers in-kind, both plotted against the
household income quintiles. For households with children in compulsory and secondary
education, the figure shows that in-kind transfers received by the household increase with
the household’s income (panels (a) and (b) of the figure). This pattern is less neat when
the focus is shifted to families with children enrolled in tertiary education (panel (c)).
Overall, the relation between transfers in kind and income turns out to be inverted u-
shaped, as shown by panel (d) in the figure. The discrepancy between expected and
un-weighted transfers in-kind distributions is explained by the probability of enrolling into
public schools (dot line), which is always decreasing in household income.
The relations shown in Figure 2 are likely to be spurious. We account for household
observable heterogeneity, which potentially affects the selection process, by controlling
for observable characteristics, as well as for the background of origin of the household.
Furthermore, we adopt a control variate approach, illustrated above, to sort out exogenous
income variations, and to see their effects along both the household income capacity and
the educational transfers in-kind distributions. To achieve this goal we need an exclusion
restriction, discussed in the following section.
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Figure 2: Income profiles for the amount, the expected amount of educational transfers
in-kind and the probability of attending public schools.
(a) Compulsory educ. transfers in-kind. (b) Secondary educ. transfers in-kind.
(c) Tertiary educ. transfers in-kind. (d) Overall educ. transfers in-kind.
Sources: SHIW, Bank of Italy, wave 2004; microsimulated educational transfers in-kind using INVALSI-
MIPA data, 2003; ISTAT, multiscopo survey (2005).
3.5 Identification strategy: instrumenting income with expected tax de-
ductions
The incidence of the self-targeting mechanism described in Besley and Coate (1991) is
driven by the correlation between the unobservable family specific income capacity (i.e.
the error term of equation (2b)) and the family specific preference for quality of the ed-
ucational good (i.e. the error term of equation (2a)). Hence, to assess the impact of
household income on in-kind transfers distribution it is necessary to single out a variation
in income that is orthogonal to the household income capacity and tastes for quality. Our
identification strategy does so by controlling for the these two components, and for their
correlation, in a control variate setting. We exploit heterogeneity in expected tax deduc-
tions accruing to the household h, denoted zh, to exogenously manipulate the distribution
of income to disentangle the effect of such manipulation from the co-movements of the
14
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errors distribution.
Description of the instrument For each household member15 m = 1, . . . ,Mh of the
household h, we calculate the expected value of the maximum tax deductions he is entitled
to as a weighted average of the four maximum tax deductions fixed by the law in 2004
(denoted di with i = 1, . . . , 4). These correspond to four levels: 7,500 euro for employed
workers, 4,500 euro for self-employed workers, 7,000 euro for retired workers and 3,000 euro
for the residual category, comprising for instance children in education.16 The probability
that family h claims any of the four deductions depends on two exogenous characteristics,
the age am and gender sm of the household member m, and is denoted ψi(am, sm). We
compute these probabilities from ISTAT (2003) using the one-year lagged value of the
observed frequencies of the distributions of the Italian population of employees, retired
persons and self-employed workers given age class and gender.17 The overall expected
amount of deductions accruing to the household is the sum of the benefits that each
member of the household is entitled to. These potential deductions at the household level
are then scaled by the household h size Mh, giving:
zh :=
∑
m∈h
1
Mh
4∑
i=1
ψi(am, sm) · di (5)
Equation (5) defines the instrument for income. At household’s member level, the instru-
ment is exogenous since it combines the four maximum tax deductions determined by the
law with the exogenous probabilities of claiming these deductions. At household level, the
instrument is exogenous under the assumption that the age and gender composition of the
household is orthogonal to the unobservable characteristics that may affect the households’
sorting process into private/public education.
The exclusion restriction The key maintained exclusion restriction for identification
is that a manipulation of the distribution of the expected tax deductions Z affects the
quantiles of the distribution of the educational transfers in kind K only through its effect
15We consider here only the parents and the offspring as household members. We disregard other relatives
living within the family even if they could potentially contribute to generate the income of the household.
16According to the Italian personal income system in 2004 the effective tax deduction accruing to each
taxpayer was related to two parameters: the source of income, and the amount of gross income. The tax
deduction system was designed to assure an exemption threshold (heterogeneous across sources of income),
and to reinforce the progressivity of the personal income tax. The direct link between the tax deduction and
the gross income explains why we do not use the effective tax deductions but rather an expected amount
as an instrument for net income.
17We consider 18 age classes made of 5 years each with the exception of the lowest (age≤ 14) and the
highest (age≥ 95). For instance, this amount to say that for all children aged less than 15 years old, the
expected maximum tax deduction amounts to 3000 euros taken with probability equal to one since, for this
age class and for both gender, the national frequencies of employees, retired persons and self-employees are
equal to zero.
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Figure 3: Validating the exclusion restriction.
(a) Conditional means given education levels. (b) Educational transfers in-kind on expected tax
deductions.
Note: We assign the following ordinal values to the educational levels of the children: the value of zero
corresponds to any educational level attended (i.e. households with children in post-compulsory schooling
age that stopped studying); to those households who have one or more children in the same educational
level, we assign the values of 1 for compulsory, 2 for upper secondary and 3 for tertiary education; we
impute to households with more than one child in different educational levels the values of 3.2 if having at
least one child in compulsory and one in secondary education, 3.4 if having at least one child in compulsory
and tertiary education, 3.6 if having at least one child in secondary and tertiary education and finally 3.8
if having at least one child in all educational levels.
on the household’s income distribution Y . This amounts to saying that the household
structure, the age and gender composition within the household have no direct effect on
the amount of educational transfers in-kind accruing to the household.
However, the instrumental variable zh might be correlated with children’s age, thus
rising potential concerns about the validity of the exclusion restriction. The data show that
the expected tax deductions do not have a direct impact on the transfers in-kind received by
the household, when conditioned for the age profiles of the children. In fact, if the children
is in compulsory schooling age, then he is entitled with a fixed deduction of 3,000 euros
while the amount of educational transfers in-kind is always positive and heterogeneous
according to the educational level (either primary or lower secondary), the region and the
reference group to which the household belongs. The expected tax deductions do not have
a direct effect on the transfers in-kind also for children in post-compulsory schooling age,
because they are independent of the true working condition of the child, while the amount
of the educational transfers in-kind depends upon his educational status.
Figure 3 supports these considerations. Expected tax deductions are flat across educa-
tional levels of the children but slightly increasing for households with children aged 14 or
above, since the national frequencies of the distributions of employees and self-employees
is positive for them. At any rate, even if there might exist a correlation between expected
tax deductions and educational transfers in-kind related to the educational level of the
16
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Figure 4: Expected tax deductions’ variability for household’s income and educational
transfers in-kind.
(a) Income on household size (b) Expected tax deductions on household size
(c) Income on expected tax deductions (d) Educ. transfers in-kind on exp. tax deductions
Sources: SHIW, Bank of Italy, wave 2004; microsimulated educational transfers in-kind using INVALSI-
MIPA data, 2003; household gross income and personal income taxes kindly provided by C. Fiorio.
children, this correlation would result to be positive while the data in figure 3 (b) show a
reverted pattern.
Our second concern is whether we are just using household size as the instrumental
variable. We clearly document in panels (a) and (b) of figure 4 that the instrument vari-
ability is substantially uncorrelated with household size. In fact, zh varies within household
size according to the age class and the gender of each household member. Moreover, across
household size, variability of our instrument does differ substantially from the variability
of income registered for both the location and the scale as shown by the different slopes of
the conditional quantile functions given household size.
Our third and last concern is whether the instrumental variable is relevant for generat-
ing sufficiently large exogenous changes in income to affect the transfers in-kind distribu-
tion. Panel (c) of figure 4 shows that household incomes increase along the distribution of
the family’s expected tax deductions. Consequently, our instrument behaves consistently
with effective tax deductions that are regressive in presence of marginal personal income
17
ECINEQ WP 2015 - 356 January 2015
Table 2: OLS, quantile regression and control function estimates.
OLS Quantiles educational transfers in-kind CF
20% 30% 50% 70% 80%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Income -0.02*** -0.00 -0.01 -0.03*** -0.02* -0.02*** -0.73***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
FB1 0.04** 0.01 0.03 0.07** 0.08* 0.07 0.58***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03)
FB2 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.05* -0.05 -0.03 0.31***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.02)
Intercept shift 0.73***
(0.03)
Note: The table reports OLS, quantile regression and control function estimates of the effect of income
on educational transfers in-kind. The specification also includes an indicator for the number of earning
recipients, dummies for the area of residence; cohort of birth of the first child of the household; gender (i.e. if
female), age, age squared, years of schooling of the family’s head; regional GDP per head and unemployment
rate; interaction terms between income and the two measures of household unobserved characteristics
related to the grandfathers occupational status and the level of education of the grandparents. These
interaction terms are not statistically different from zero. The control function specification further includes
the residuals of the first stage regression and their interaction with income. The first stage regression
corresponds to OLS estimates of equation (2b). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for
OLS and control function estimates while bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses for
quantile regression estimates.
taxes. The amount of educational transfers in-kind is lower for higher quintiles of the
expected tax deductions (panel (d) of figure 4). These two graphs hint that the reduced
form regression of an exogenous manipulation of the prevailing distribution of incomes on
various quantiles of educational transfers in-kind distribution would estimate a negative
effect of the former on the latter variable.
4 Results
4.1 Benchmark
Table 2 illustrates some benchmark results. The income coefficient from an OLS regression,
reported in column (1), is negligible but significant, which might be the consequence of
averaging the heterogeneity in the income effects along the distribution of transfers in-
kind.18 Columns (2) to (6) reject this conjecture, by showing that the income effect is
generally negative and close to zero, and it turns out to be significant only above the
median of the educational transfers in-kind distribution.
18If educational transfers in-kind are redistributive, it might be the case that the marginal effect of income
is negative in the upper part but positive in the lower part of the educational transfers in-kind distribution.
18
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Like the OLS, the quantile regression coefficients do not have a causal interpretation
when there are unobservable dimensions that simultaneously affect both income and in-
kind transfers. We use a control function (denoted CF) approach to cope with this form
of endogeneity of income. The CF estimates account for heterogeneity in income effects
by conditioning on residuals of a first stage income regression, where we use expected
household tax deductions as an instrument, and the interaction between income and these
residuals. The coefficient of the estimated residuals determines the shift of the intercept
of the educational transfers in-kind function associated to households’ self-selection. The
interaction term captures, instead, the slope shift effect of the marginal change of income,
which is associated to the unobservable heterogeneity in household characteristics. As
reported in column (7) of table 2 , this interaction terms is not statistically significant.19
The CF estimate of the marginal effect of income corresponds to −0.73, confirming
an upward bias of the OLS estimate equal to −0.02. Under plausible assumptions,20 this
coefficient measures the average marginal treatment effect of income in the population.
In fact, the control function can be conceived as a structural relation that provides the
counterfactual conditional expectations of k given y (and other covariates), if y could
be manipulated independently of the errors as if the endogeneity of y was absent and
household income capacity would be perfectly observable by the government implementing
the mechanism (Blundell and Powell 2003).
The CF method incorporates assumptions on the intercept-slope shift effects of income
on the conditional distributions of the endogenous variables, offering only a conditional
mean perspective of the underlying structural relations. In fact, it does not allow to verify
how and whether the marginal effect of income varies across both the income capacity
and preferences for the quality of the educational good distributions. Structural quantile
treatment effect estimation broadens this view, offering a more complete characterization
of the stochastic relationship between income and educational transfers in-kind.
4.2 First stage
Table 3 reports quantile estimates of equation (2b) for the working sample, and for two
subsamples of households with at least one child in compulsory and upper secondary school-
ing age. We interpret the estimated coefficients as the sum of two effects through which a
change in the instrument affects the distribution of income, as outlined below.
Let yN be the net of taxes income, corresponding to the gross income yG minus the
19Given the linear model specification and the insignificance of the interaction term between the first
stage residuals and the income variable, IV and control function estimates are here equivalent.
20Our two measures of unobservable household characteristics related to the grandfathers occupational
conditions and grandparents’ level of education and other household specific heterogeneity components
unrelated to these two family background variables are all mean independent of the instrument z in such
a way that the instrument is as good as randomly assigned.
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Table 3: Structural quantile treatment effect estimation: first stage.
Quantile of income
20% 30% 50% 70% 80%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Main sample
Exp. tax deductions 0.907*** 1.156** 1.045*** 1.348*** 1.665***
(0.17) (0.56) (0.18) (0.21) (0.38)
Comp. education
Exp. tax deductions 1.069*** 1.109*** 6.853*** 1.879*** 2.166***
(0.28) (0.28) (0.37) (0.48) (0.50)
Upper sec. education
Exp. tax deductions 1.049*** 1.015** 1.168*** 1.138*** 0.846
(0.32) (0.47) (0.30) (0.43) (0.52)
Note: The table reports the first stage of the structural quantile treatment effect estimates. The specifica-
tion also includes an indicator for the number of earning recipients, dummies for the area of residence and a
polynomial of degree one in the cohort of birth of the first child of the household; gender (i.e. if female), age,
age squared, years of schooling of the family’s head; regional GDP per head and unemployment rate and
the two measures of household unobserved characteristics related to the grandfathers occupational status
and the level of education of the grandparents. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses.
personal income tax liability T , with T = t(yG−d) where t represents the average tax rate
and d a tax deduction. We can decompose the overall effect of a change of (expected) tax
deductions on net of taxes income as follows:
∂yN
∂d
= t′ +
∂yG
∂d
(1− t′)
where t′ stands for marginal personal income tax rate. Recall that in Italy the taxation
system is individualized, hence the effects of a change in (expected) tax deductions affect
primarily the income of each household member.
The variation of (net of taxes) income due to a one euro increase of (expected) tax
deductions is the sum of the tax cut equal to the marginal tax rate (the direct effect), and
of the variation of the gross income net of the marginal tax rate (the indirect effect). In
principle, the latter effect can be either negative or positive depending on the behavioral
labor supply response of each household member. It is negative if an income effect prevails,
while it is positive if the response to the increase in net income amounts to substituting
leisure with labour. At the household level, the effect of expected tax deductions on income
corresponds to the sum of the effects estimated for each component of the family.
The estimates of the first stage regression, reported in table 3, highlight the pattern of
the variation of the coefficient of the expected tax deductions across the selected quantiles of
the income distribution. These coefficients are always statistically significant at 1% in the
working sample and positive, with values always greater than the maximum marginal tax
20
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Figure 5: Marginal quantile treatment effects of income.
Note: The figure plots the marginal quantile treatment effects of income for a given quantile of the household
income capacity. These marginal quantile treatment effects are calculated taking also into account the
interaction between income and the residuals of the given quantile of the household income capacity, and
the interactions between income and our two measures of household unobserved characteristics related to
the grandfathers occupational status and the level of education of the grandparents, each of them considered
separately. Confidence bands at 99% level.
rate accruing to personal income taxes in Italy (45%). This suggests that the substitution
effect dominates the income effect on the household labor supply.
4.3 Structural quantile treatment effects on the working sample
Figure 5 plots the marginal quantile treatment effects of income on the quantiles of the
transfers in-kind distribution, at selected income capacity levels, for the working sample.
Overall, an exogenous increase in income is always associated to a decrease in transfers in-
kind accruing to the households. These coefficients are obtained after controlling for family
background characteristics, captured by FB1 and FB2. The signs of the effects of these
variables coincide with the signs of the quantile residuals, are positive, and statistically
significant at 1% level. Hence, the two variables are capturing different household unob-
servable characteristics that have an independent effect on the amount of the educational
transfers in-kind distribution.
To properly interpret the figure and to assess the premises of the sorting mechanism,
it is necessary to fix one of the two dimensions of heterogeneity at a time.
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Fixing quantiles τY of the household income capacity. For a given quantile of
the income capacity, identified by each of the five panels in figure 5, we find that the
magnitude of the (negative) effect of household income on the transfers in-kind distribution
increases with the taste for educational quality, identified by the quantiles of transfers in-
kind reported in the horizontal axis in each of the panels of the figure. Table 4, panel
(a), reports the statistical test for the difference between the impact of income on the
lowest level of quality tastes (τK = 20%) and the same effect at high level of quality tastes
(τK = 80%), respectively for each panel in figure 5. These differences are always positive
and in most of the cases significant, indicating that the negative effect of income on the
transfers distribution is attenuated at the bottom of the distribution compared to what
happens at the top. This result is consistent with the view that, given income capacity
τY , households with higher tastes for educational quality are more keen to sacrifice an
higher marginal benefit of income and opting out from the public education system to buy
higher quality schooling, compared to households with lower tastes for the quality of the
educational good.
Fixing quantiles τK of the household preferences for quality. For a given quantile
of the preferences for quality, we find that the magnitude of the negative effect of household
income on the transfers in-kind decreases across the quantiles of income capacity. To see
this pattern, it is necessary to keep track of the effect of income on the same quantile of the
transfers in-kind distribution across the five panels in figure 5. Table 4, panel (b), reports
the statistical test for the difference between the impact of income on transfers in-kind
at low income capacity (τY = 20%) and high income capacity (τY = 80%), respectively
for each level of preferences for education. These differences are always negative and
significant, and their magnitude is increasing with τK . This result is consistent with the
view that, given preferences for education, households with higher income capacity face
larger incentives to opt out from the public education system compared to families with
low income capacity. That is, when the household income capacity increases, the marginal
effect of income becomes smaller in absolute value since more families sort themselves into
private education gaining a zero marginal benefit from public education provision.
Mean (quantile) treatment effects. The assumptions made on the structure of er-
rors in the structural quantile treatment effect model have provided insights into how the
dimensions of income capacity and preferences for education are connected. As suggested
by Ma and Koenker (2006), there are other relevant but more aggregated evaluation pa-
rameters that can be retrieved from structural quantile treatment effects estimation. The
mean quantile treatment effect is obtained by integrating out the distribution of the house-
hold income capacity, while the mean treatment effect results from averaging these last
22
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Table 4: Homogeneity tests.
Panel (a): 20th and 80th quantiles of K, given τY
τY : 20% τY : 30% τY : 50% τY : 70% τY : 80%
0.184* 0.149* 0.166 0.133** 0.108
(0.10) (0.09) (0.13) (0.07) (0.09)
Panel (b): 20th and 80th quantiles of Y, given τK
τK : 20% τK : 30% τK : 50% τK : 70% τK : 80%
-0.570*** -0.613*** -0.604*** -0.624*** -0.647***
(0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10)
Note: The table reports the homogeneity tests of the marginal quantile treatment effects of income. Panel
(a) displays the difference between the marginal income effects estimated at the 20th and the 80th quantiles
of educational transfers in-kind distribution, fixing quantiles of the household income capacity. Panel (b)
displays instead the difference between the marginal income effects estimated at the 20th and the 80th
quantiles of the household income capacity, fixing quantiles of the educational transfers in-kind distribution.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
effects with respect to the quantiles of the distribution of the educational transfers in-kind.
The mean treatment effect theoretically coincides with what is estimated by the two-stage
least-squares estimator in the pure location shift version of the model, and in our case,
where the interactions terms are not significant, it should correspond to the average treat-
ment effect estimated in section 4.1 using control function method. Figure 6 supports this
argument. The difference between the average treatment effect retrieved in the CF set-
ting and the mean treatment effect obtained from our structural quantile treatment effect
estimates is small and perhaps related to our hypothesis to assign a zero weight to the
poorest and richest quintiles of the distributions of both the household income capacity
and of the amount of educational transfers in-kind, in order to compute the final mean
treatment effect. Patterns in the figures support the internal consistency of the structural
model estimates.
4.4 Analysis across educational levels
The Besley and Coate (1991) mechanism applies to compulsory education provision, where
enrolment is mandatory to all children and parents only have to choose between private
or public schooling. The households’ choice for post-compulsory education is, instead,
sequential. First, the household decides whether or not to enroll the child at school. Only
in the event that the child attends post-compulsory education, the household chooses
between private and public education. To account for these issues, this section deals with
replicating our main analysis for two subsamples that distinguish between families with
children in compulsory schooling age and those with children in upper secondary schooling
23
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Figure 6: Mean quantile treatment effects of income.
Note: The figure plots the mean quantile treatment effects, the mean treatment effect of income and the
coefficient estimated using control function method reported in Table 2. The mean quantile treatment
effects are calculated integrating out the distribution of the household income capacity. To each of the
point of the structural quantile treatment effects’ estimates (i.e. the 20th, 30th, 50th, 70th and 80th
quantile estimates), we assign as weight the area under the distribution of the household income capacity
calculated at the corresponding fixed point. The lowest and the highest quintiles of the distribution of the
household income capacity are assumed to a have a weight equal to zero. The mean treatment effect is
obtained by averaging again, using the same procedure, this time, across the quantiles of the distribution
of the educational transfers in-kind. Confidence bands at 99% level.
age. Additional tables with robustness checks are reported in the appendix.21
Compulsory education. Panel (a) of figure 7 illustrates the marginal effect of income
on the amount of educational transfers in-kind when the empirical assessment is restricted
to families with at least one child in compulsory schooling age.22 Estimates are based on
a reduced sample of 888 households. We find that an increase in income affects positively
the 20th and 30th quantiles of educational transfers in-kind distribution, while the effect
turns out to be significant and negative at quantiles above the median. The marginal
impact of income on the median amount of educational transfers in-kind is negligible and
insignificant when evaluated at the median level of the household income capacity.
21In appendix C, we report estimates for a variety of subsamples: households with children in compulsory
schooling age including kindergarten; households with children in both secondary and tertiary schooling
age; households with children in tertiary schooling age.
22Here, we are not including families with children at kindergarten since kindergarten is not compulsory
in Italy.
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Figure 7: Marginal quantile treatment effects of income: sub-samples.
(a) Compulsory education (b) Upper secondary education
Note: The figure plots the marginal quantile treatment effects of income for a given quantile of the household
income capacity for the sub-samples of compulsory education, (panel (a)), and upper secondary education,
(panel (b)). These marginal quantile treatment effects are calculated taking also into account the inter-
action between income and the residuals of the given quantile of the household income capacity, and the
interactions between income and our two measures of household unobserved characteristics related to the
grandfathers occupational status and the level of education of the grandparents, each of them considered
separately. Confidence bands at 99% level.
At the lower quantiles of the educational transfers in-kind distribution and for a given
income capacity of the households, only families that value less the quality of the educa-
tional services consume the publicly provided educational good. Since quality is a normal
good, the marginal effect of an increase in income on the amount of educational transfers
in-kind is positive for them.
Given household income capacity, at higher quantiles of the educational transfers in-
kind, households who value more the quality of the educational good reveal their pref-
erences being ready to give away an higher marginal income gain from public education
provision. For this reason, the sign of the marginal effect of income on the amount of
educational transfers in-kind turns out to be negative. Moreover, the higher the quantile
of the educational transfers in-kind distribution, the higher the magnitude of the marginal
income gain these families are willing to give up. Overall, the households valuing less
the quality of the educational services and having a lower income capacity are those who
benefit more from the publicly provided mandatory education system.
Figure 7 provides also evidence of the self-targeting mechanism showing that the edu-
cational transfers in-kind is redistributive. In fact, the magnitude of the negative marginal
effect of income attenuates along the household income capacity distribution, holding tastes
for quality as fixed. This suggests that for a given quality level of the public educational
good, the higher the household income capacity, the higher the proportion of families who
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opt out to private education and gain consequently a zero marginal benefit from public
education provision.23 Overall, the households who value more the quality of the educa-
tional services and have an higher income capacity are those who benefit less from the
public mandatory education provision.
Upper secondary education. Panel (b) of figure 7 shows a different picture, obtained
from repeating the analysis on the 767 families with at least one child in upper secondary
schooling age. In this case, the marginal effects of income on transfers in-kind are always
positive. In upper secondary education, the mechanisms through which families self-select
into private and public education are, therefore, different from the mechanisms under-
lying compulsory education. However, under the assumption that the expected returns
to education of the offspring are positively correlated with the realized return in income
of the family of origin (i.e. the realized returns can be forecast by observed family in-
come), one can speculate that families are self-selecting into post-compulsory education,
independently on whether public or private, according to the expected returns to children
education compared to the costs of attending education. Keeping educational costs as
fixed, households are more likely to choose higher levels of education if the returns to ed-
ucation of the children is higher. For given expected returns, households are more likely
to choose higher level of education if the costs, including the opportunity costs in terms of
forgone wage, are lower.
The marginal effects of income at the 20th quantile of educational transfers in-kind
distribution are always statistically positive and larger than the same effects calculated at
the 80th quantile, irrespectively of household income capacity. On the contrary, the effects
at the 80th quantile of the educational transfers in-kind distribution (indicating high level
of preferences for education quality) are never significant. This result is consistent with the
findings presented by Bertola et al. (2007) and Bertola and Checchi (2013), who suggest
that the teaching quality of private schooling for upper secondary education is not higher
than the quality of public schools, suggesting a remedial scope for private education in
Italy.24 If this is the case, the incentive compatibility constraints of rich households cannot
be satisfied and the assumptions behind the Besley and Coate (1991) mechanism, required
to achieve redistribution through public education provision, are clearly violated.
Finally, panels (a) and (b) of figure 8 plot the mean quantile treatment effects and the
23For quantiles either lower or equal to the median of K’s distribution, however, the equality between
these marginal effects at the lowest and highest quantiles of the household income capacity cannot be
rejected. As discussed above, this is likely to be the consequence of the fact that the households who value
less the quality of the schooling system consume the publicly provided educational good independently of
their income.
24The same qualitatively result can be found when we use the subsample of families with children in
post-compulsory schooling. There is instead no evidence of either a remedial role for private universities
or self-targeting of the families into tertiary education. These results are shown in the appendix.
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Figure 8: Mean quantile treatment effects of income: sub-samples.
(a) Compulsory education (b) Upper secondary education
Note: The figure plots the mean quantile treatment effects of income for the sub-samples of compulsory
education, (panel (a)), and upper secondary education, (panel (b)). The mean quantile treatment effects
are calculated integrating out the distribution of the household income capacity. To each of the point
of the structural quantile treatment effects’ estimates (i.e. the 20th, 30th, 50th, 70th and 80th quantile
estimates), we assign as weight the area under the distribution of the household income capacity calculated
at the corresponding fixed point. The lowest and the highest quintiles of the distribution of the household
income capacity are assumed to a have a weight equal to zero. The mean treatment effect is obtained
by averaging again, using the same procedure, this time, across the quantiles of the distribution of the
educational transfers in-kind. Confidence bands at 99% level.
mean treatment effect for compulsory and upper secondary education. These parameters
are retrieved from the structural quantile treatment effects estimates integrated over the
dimensions of the household income capacity and tastes for education quality. In both
cases, this validation check confirms the consistency of the structural quantile treatment
estimates with the average treatment effect of income on transfers in-kind estimated using
control function method. Consequently, data seem to reject the premises of self-targeting
into private and public post-compulsory education.
5 Conclusions
This paper tests one of the mechanisms behind the redistributiveness of public education
provision, by analyzing the sorting process into public and private education among Italian
households. We quantify the value of public educational services received by an household
with children in education as the monetary equivalent transfer in-kind received by the
household opting for public education. Operationally, the in-kind transfer is measured by
the expected cost supported by the government to provide the service almost inexpensively
for the families. This is an objective measure of the quality of the educational services
provided by the public sector.
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We show that an increase in income reduces the amount of educational transfers in-kind
(i) more for higher quantiles of the educational transfers in-kind, keeping income capacity
as fixed, (ii) more for lower quantiles of the household income capacity, holding tastes for
education quality as constant. Overall, the households who value less the quality of the
educational services and have a lower income capacity are those who benefit more from
compulsory educational services provided by the public sector. We interpret these results
as evidence that public education provision can be assimilated to a progressive transfer of
income because rich households with high preferences for the quality of the educational
good sort themselves into private education, while contributing to its financing. This is
consistent with the premises of the Besley and Coate (1991) mechanism.
Our results suggest that reforms of the public education system that aim at altering the
quality of the publicly provided education services are expected to alter this self-targeting
mechanism. However, this does not necessarily imply that such reforms would lead to a
loss in either efficiency or equity terms. In their conclusions, Besley and Coate (1991)
underline that public education provision might not necessarily be part of an optimally
designed redistributional package. The deadweight loss associated with universal educa-
tion provision suggests that similar distributional goals could be achieved more efficiently
through other feasible policies.
Moreover, our empirical investigation shows that the premises of the Besley and Coate
(1991) mechanism applies to compulsory schooling but not at post-compulsory education
level where families likely sort into the education system according to the expected returns
to their children education compared to the costs of attending schooling. For given costs,
if the expected returns to education of the offspring are positively correlated with the
(realized return in) income of the family, children coming from rich families attend pro-
portionally more post-compulsory education. For given expected returns, children coming
from rich households face a lower opportunity cost of enrolling at schools. These consid-
erations seem to hold for Italian data independently of the type of school chosen and pave
the way to argue that publicly provided post-compulsory education is not redistributive.
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Appendices
A Assessing the average costs per student at regional and
educational level
The estimation of the average cost of public education by region and educational level is a
difficult exercise. The Financial Statement (Rendiconto Generale) of the Italian Ministry
of Education (MIUR) records public spending on education according to two classifica-
tions. One aggregates data at the central government level, distinguishing across different
levels of education but not across different regions. The other organizes data by regions
but does not distinguish across different educational levels. For all education levels up
to upper secondary school (including pre-primary and excluding tertiary education) we
take advantage of ASPIS III carried out by the Italian National Institute for the Eval-
uation of Education System (INVALSI) and the Consortium for the Development of the
Methodologies and Innovations of the Public Administrations (MIPA) exclusively for the
year 2003. This study draws together information arising from several sources (Ministry
of Economy, Ministry of Education, Italian Institute of Statistics) to develop a matrix of
public expenditures on education based on both the regional and the educational level
dimensions.
Although competencies on public education in Italy are spread across several authori-
ties25, in this paper we use regions as the unit of analysis for three main reasons. First, the
main source of variation in educational expenditures in Italy is at the local level, as 95%
of the central government spending on education finances the salaries of the teaching and
non teaching staff. Second, regions (which territory is then organized into provinces and
municipalities) can be considered as ’whole units’ due to the complex system of financial
transfers from higher to lower levels of governments (mainly from regions to province and
municipalities). ASPIS III collects data from a consolidated financial statement of central
government and local authorities, and avoids the risk of double counting the value of expen-
ditures which are financed by transfers from higher to lower levels of government. Third,
INVALSI-MIPA (2005) emphasizes the regional (together with the educational level) di-
mension, implicitly recognizing a primary source of variation at this level.
In what follows, we describe the main features of the methodology developed by AS-
PIS III. All details (only in Italian) can be found in the accompanying reports Asquini
and Bettoni (2003) and INVALSI-MIPA (2005). Finally, a specific section describes the
methodology used to calculate the average cost of tertiary education.
A.1 Pre-primary, primary, lower and upper secondary school
In order to attribute central government expenditures by educational levels to regions and,
conversely, region-specific expenditures to different educational levels, ASPIS III exploits a
number of so called drivers. For instance, the main driver is represented by the number of
students and of teaching and non-teaching staff in each region and educational level. For
25According to INVALSI-MIPA (2005) 71% of the public expenditures for education (from pre-primary
to upper secondary) is financed by the central state, while regions account for 6%, provinces for 5.5% and
the remaining, 17.5%, is financed by municipalities.
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this reason, these data take account, at least in part, of differences in quality and efficiency
in the public service production across regions and levels of education.
ASPIS III data can be organized in a r×e matrix whose cells record the public spending
(total costs) on education for 20 Italian regions (r) and 4 educational levels (e) for year
2003. We divide each of these total costs by the total number of students enrolled at
school reported in the corresponding cell of an analogue r × e matrix. We end up with a
r × e matrix providing the average spending per student by region and educational level
indicated in the main text as AC(r, e).26 We finally apply regional-specific general indexes
of consumer prices to inflate these average costs to 2004.
A.2 Tertiary education
We adopt a different strategy to estimate the average costs of providing public tertiary
education. We calculate the overall amount of resources that each Italian university receives
from the central government and the local public authorities from the reclassified financial
statements of Italian public universities (either state or regional) provided by the national
committee for the evaluation of the Italian tertiary education system (CNVSU) for year
2004. This overall amount of resources measures the total costs of producing tertiary
education at university level.
The regional total costs are obtained by summing up total costs accruing to all univer-
sities located in a given region. These regional total costs are then divided by the number
of students enrolled in each region to end up with the average regional costs of providing
public tertiary education. Notice that these average costs are net of the fees paid by the
households and consequently they represent the costs actually borne by the government.
We take account of students’ mobility across regions by weighting each regional average
costs by the probability that a student resident in a certain region is enrolled at a university
in a different region. These probabilities are calculated using a 20× 20 students’ mobility
matrix based on the enrollment statistics of MIUR.27
B Assessing family background to control for household het-
erogeneity
We use two family background indicators for either education or socio-economic position
of the grand-parents to partition the observed families into homogeneous groups. These
information can be found in SHIW.28 We consider each of these two family background
indicators separately to let different kinds of household unobserved characteristics be as-
sociated to different family background indicators.
26Households’ out-of-pocket payments and other financial sources beyond government are excluded. Con-
sequently, these average costs purely reflect public expenditures on education.
27SHIW 2004 data do not provide information on the university currently attended by the children.
In Italy, generally, students enrolled at a university located in a region other than that of their parents’
residence, use not to change their residence. In such a case, they would be surveyed by the Bank of Italy
within the family.
28The questionnaire of the survey reports this questions: ”What were the educational qualifications,
employment status and sector of activity of your parents when they were your present age? (If the parent
was retired or deceased at that age, refer to time preceding retirement or death)”.
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Figure 9: Measuring household unobservable characteristics related to family backgrounds.
(a) Grandparents’ occupational conditions (b) Grandparents’ level of education
We retain all households in the full dataset whose head aged from 33 to 60 years to avoid
a fertility composition effect which may arise if we make use of our sample made of 2,030
families with children in education age. Then, we use 3,651 and 3,698 observations when
referring to grandparental occupational conditions and level of education, respectively. The
difference in observations between the two family background indicators is due to missing
data.
We use a similar taxonomy as in Lefranc, Pistolesi and Trannoy (2009) to classify
the grand-fathers (i.e. the fathers of both parents in an household) in the observed fam-
ilies according to their occupational status.29 To maintain a parsimonious structure, we
collapse grand-fathers’ background information into two categories. The disadvantaged
grand-parental background gathers the grand-fathers unemployed or employed either in
agriculture or as an unskilled manual worker; and into an advantaged grand-parental back-
ground, comprising all the other cases. To account for the composite effect of having an
advantaged or disadvantaged parental background from the side of both spouses, we con-
sider three family background groups, defined according to the socioeconomic position of
the fathers of both spouses. The first purely disadvantaged background group comprises
all the families for which both grandfathers were disadvantaged. The second purely ad-
vantaged background group comprises all the families where both spouses’ fathers were
advantaged. Finally, the third residual group identifies a mixed background of origin.30
We repeat the classification also according to level of education of the grandparents.
In this case, the purely disadvantaged (advantaged) background group includes all the
households for which both spouses’ parents had on average (more than) 5 years of education
or lower.31 The mixed group is defined by combining the two classes.
29Lefranc et al. (2009) apply this taxonomy to show that in France exists inequality of opportunities in
income acquisition since individuals experiencing different social origins related to their father’s occupation
are not guaranteed an equal access to advantage in earning income. Following them, we consider only the
grandfather’s occupational background since a large part of the grandmothers were housewives.
30In this group, we include also those families with missing information on the occupational background
of the father of one of the two spouses.
31We fix the level of advantage to higher than 5 years of education level since enrollment in primary
education reached 90% only in 1931. The presence of a double track schooling system weakened the
enforceability of 8 years of compulsory education as dictated by both the Gentile’s law and the article n.34
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Figure 10: Deviations from quantile specific weighted average at family level, by grand-
parental background.
(a) Income quantiles (b) Educational transfers in-kind quantiles
(c) Income quantiles (d) Educational transfers in-Kind quantiles
Notes: Deviations from quantile specific incomes beyond the 1500 euros interval have been
trimmed for presentation purposes.
For each of the three groups generated by each of the two backgrounds of interest, we
rank households within each group according to their income. To isolate the contribution of
the group of origin at fixed degree of unobservable characteristics (abilities), we compare for
each background variable the income of a family at a given rank with the income that the
family with the same abilities (identified by her position in the group specific distribution)
would have reached if the background of origin were equalized across all families, thus
expecting the average attainable income. This latter distribution would coincide with the
distribution estimated from the whole sample. To obtain reliable estimates of this residual
income measure, each group’s population is partitioned into 100 percentiles according to
the observed incomes of these households. The set of households in the same percentile
relative to their group is denoted P (pj). This set gathers all families with similar abilities.
Using this set, we consider as a sufficient statistics 32 for the household unobservable
of the Italian Constitution (1948). It is only with Law n.1859, December 31st 1962, which abolished the
second track (the avviamento al lavoro) of the schooling system, that all children were constrained until
age 14 to follow a single program, encompassing primary education and lower secondary school.
32We construct this sufficient statistics exploiting what is known in the equality of opportunity literature
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characteristics related to each of the two family background, the estimated residual ε̂ of
the following regression model:
yh =
100∑
j=1
γj · 1 [h ∈ P (pj)] + εh, (6)
where 1[.] is an indicator function for the condition expressed in its argument to be sat-
isfied. This indicator function is empirically captured by sets of dummies which take the
value of 1 in correspondence of the rank occupied by the household in her group specific
income distribution.
These residuals can be conceived as the empirical counterpart of the vertical distance
between each family background specific quantile functions F−1t (p), shown in figure 9, and
the quantile functions of the whole sample income distribution.
To clarify the concept, families with positive residuals are those which have abilities
that provide them an advantage in income with respect to the other households experienc-
ing different family background but sitting in the same percentile. These disadvantaged
households would counterfactually have the same income realization of the advantaged one
if grown-up in a different family background. Given this setting, there are no differences in
families’ abilities with respect to any of the two (or both) grandparental backgrounds when
the corresponding residuals are equal to zero for each percentile of the income distribution
in such a way that the family background specific distributions are identical. In figure 10
we plot these residuals across the quantile distributions of both income and educational
transfers in-kind.
as the Roemer Identification Assumption (RIA) to accounting for effort in income, (see Roemer 1998).
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C Additional materials not intended for publication
Table 5: Structural quantile treatment effects: main sample.
Ind. variable: Quantiles Educational Transfers In-kind
τK : 20% τK : 30% τK : 50% τK : 70% τK : 80%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τY : 20%
Income -1.252*** -1.343*** -1.330*** -1.385*** -1.437***
(0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Location shift 1.267*** 1.358*** 1.322*** 1.375*** 1.418***
(0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
τY : 30%
Income -0.982*** -1.050*** -1.046*** -1.089*** -1.132***
(0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Location shift 0.994*** 1.064*** 1.037*** 1.079*** 1.113***
(0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
τY : 50%
Income -1.084*** -1.161*** -1.156*** -1.203*** -1.251***
(0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.11)
Location shift 1.096*** 1.172*** 1.147*** 1.193*** 1.232***
(0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.10)
τY : 70%
Income -0.840*** -0.900*** -0.898*** -0.937*** -0.972***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Location shift 0.849*** 0.908*** 0.889*** 0.925*** 0.954***
(0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
τY : 80%
Income -0.683*** -0.730*** -0.726*** -0.761*** -0.790***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08)
Location shift 0.690*** 0.737*** 0.718*** 0.749*** 0.772***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 6: Structural quantile treatment effects: main sample.
Ind. variable: Quantiles Educational Transfers In-kind
τK : 20% τK : 30% τK : 50% τK : 70% τK : 80%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τY : 20%
FB1 0.628*** 0.698*** 0.675*** 0.713*** 0.724***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
FB2 0.399*** 0.396*** 0.413*** 0.423*** 0.434***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
τY : 30%
FB1 0.613*** 0.682*** 0.661*** 0.698*** 0.709***
(0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
FB2 0.332*** 0.321*** 0.341*** 0.347*** 0.355***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
τY : 50%
FB1 0.839*** 0.924*** 0.899*** 0.945*** 0.965***
(0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
FB2 0.404*** 0.400*** 0.416*** 0.425*** 0.436***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08)
τY : 70%
FB1 0.713*** 0.790*** 0.764*** 0.806*** 0.820***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
FB2 0.365*** 0.360*** 0.377*** 0.384*** 0.394***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
τY : 80%
FB1 0.558*** 0.620*** 0.594*** 0.629*** 0.639***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.13)
FB2 0.337*** 0.333*** 0.346*** 0.354*** 0.362***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 7: Structural quantile treatment effects: compulsory education.
Ind. variable: Quantiles Educational Transfers In-kind
τK : 20% τK : 30% τK : 50% τK : 70% τK : 80%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τY : 20%
Income 0.289 0.211*** -0.251** -1.114*** -1.403***
(0.23) (0.07) (0.12) (0.13) (0.16)
Location shift -0.276 -0.194*** 0.291** 1.131*** 1.424***
(0.27) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16)
τY : 30%
Income 0.279*** 0.205*** -0.241** -1.075*** -1.353***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.12) (0.13) (0.08)
Location shift -0.267*** -0.188** 0.280** 1.091*** 1.373***
(0.05) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.08)
τY : 50%
Income 0.055*** 0.046*** -0.014 -0.168*** -0.214***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Location shift -0.041*** -0.030** 0.048** 0.177*** 0.226***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
τY : 70%
Income 0.169*** 0.130*** -0.133** -0.633*** -0.792***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05)
Location shift -0.157*** -0.114*** 0.169*** 0.647*** 0.810***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05)
τY : 80%
Income 0.149*** 0.114*** -0.114** -0.549*** -0.685***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04)
Location shift -0.138*** -0.099** 0.149*** 0.562*** 0.702***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 8: Structural quantile treatment effects: compulsory education.
Ind. variable: Quantiles Educational Transfers In-kind
τK : 20% τK : 30% τK : 50% τK : 70% τK : 80%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τY : 20%
FB1 -0.150 -0.113** 0.030 0.278*** 0.395***
(0.10) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06)
FB2 -0.121 -0.066 0.220** 0.735*** 0.867***
(0.11) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09) (0.14)
τY : 30%
FB1 -0.171*** -0.129** 0.058 0.365*** 0.508***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06)
FB2 -0.095** -0.047 0.187** 0.625*** 0.727***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06)
τY : 50%
FB1 -0.001 -0.009 -0.105* -0.305*** -0.361***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
FB2 -0.026 0.007 0.097* 0.307*** 0.340***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
τY : 70%
FB1 -0.186*** -0.140*** 0.086 0.436*** 0.582***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
FB2 -0.076 -0.036 0.161* 0.545*** 0.629***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06)
τY : 80%
FB1 -0.147*** -0.110** 0.049 0.276*** 0.385***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
FB2 -0.082* -0.040 0.167* 0.568*** 0.653***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 9: Homogeneity tests.
Panel (a): 20th and 80th quantiles of K, given τY
τY : 20% τY : 30% τY : 50% τY : 70% τY : 80%
1.692*** 1.633*** 0.268*** 0.960*** 0.833***
(0.28) (0.09) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04)
Panel (b): 20th and 80th quantiles of Y, given τK
τK : 20% τK : 30% τK : 50% τK : 70% τK : 80%
0.140 0.098 -0.137 -0.565*** -0.717***
(0.24) (0.08) (0.13) (0.14) (0.17)
Note: The Table reports the homogeneity tests of marginal quantile treatment effects of income, for com-
pulsory education. Panel (a) displays the difference between the marginal income effects estimated at the
20th and the 80th quantiles of educational transfers in-kind distribution, fixing quantiles of the household
income capacity. Panel (b) displays instead the difference between the marginal income effects estimated
at the 20th and the 80th quantiles of the household income capacity, fixing quantiles of the educational
transfers in-kind distribution. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 10: Structural quantile treatment effects: upper secondary education.
Ind. variable: Quantiles Educational Transfers In-kind
τK : 20% τK : 30% τK : 50% τK : 70% τK : 80%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τY : 20%
Income 0.409*** 0.412*** 0.397*** 0.206** 0.152
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.12)
Location shift -0.386*** -0.391*** -0.384*** -0.223** -0.174
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.13)
τY : 30%
Income 0.446*** 0.424*** 0.409*** 0.215*** 0.154
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.11)
Location shift -0.427*** -0.403*** -0.396*** -0.232*** -0.176
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.12)
τY : 50%
Income 0.390*** 0.371*** 0.360*** 0.183** 0.138
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.11)
Location shift -0.371*** -0.353*** -0.351*** -0.199*** -0.158
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.12)
τY : 70%
Income 0.399*** 0.380*** 0.368*** 0.194** 0.148
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.11)
Location shift -0.382*** -0.365*** -0.361*** -0.209*** -0.169
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.12)
τY : 80%
Income 0.521*** 0.506*** 0.495*** 0.273*** 0.210
(0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.15)
Location shift -0.506*** -0.491*** -0.492*** -0.287*** -0.231
(0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.16)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 11: Structural quantile treatment effects: upper secondary education.
Ind. variable: Quantiles Educational Transfers In-kind
τK : 20% τK : 30% τK : 50% τK : 70% τK : 80%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τY : 20%
FB1 -0.127*** -0.118*** -0.114*** -0.020 0.010
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08)
FB2 0.133*** 0.134*** 0.154*** 0.138** 0.104
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09)
τY : 30%
FB1 -0.174*** -0.156*** -0.150*** -0.038 -0.004
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09)
FB2 0.004 -0.004 0.018 0.058 0.048
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08)
τY : 50%
FB1 -0.202*** -0.189*** -0.181*** -0.051 -0.013
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.09)
FB2 0.027 0.028 0.040 0.067 0.057
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
τY : 70%
FB1 -0.233*** -0.223*** -0.205*** -0.070 -0.018
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10)
FB2 -0.016 -0.007 0.004 0.056 0.034
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08)
τY : 80%
FB1 -0.329*** -0.316*** -0.302*** -0.131 -0.061
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.11)
FB2 0.003 0.006 0.015 0.070 0.041
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.09)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 12: Homogeneity tests.
Panel (a): 20th and 80th quantiles of K, given τY
τY : 20% τY : 30% τY : 50% τY : 70% τY : 80%
0.249** 0.287** 0.249** 0.252** 0.316*
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.16)
Panel (b): 20th and 80th quantiles of Y, given τK
τK : 20% τK : 30% τK : 50% τK : 70% τK : 80%
-0.113 -0.094 -0.098 -0.067 -0.057
(0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.13) (0.19)
Note: The Table reports the homogeneity tests of marginal quantile treatment effects of income, upper
secondary education. Panel (a) displays the difference between the marginal income effects estimated at the
20th and the 80th quantiles of educational transfers in-kind distribution, fixing quantiles of the household
income capacity. Panel (b) displays instead the difference between the marginal income effects estimated
at the 20th and the 80th quantiles of the household income capacity, fixing quantiles of the educational
transfers in-kind distribution. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 13: Structural quantile treatment effects.
Compulsory education including kindergarten.
Ind. variable: Quantiles Educational Transfers In-kind
τK : 20% τK : 30% τK : 50% τK : 70% τK : 80%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τY : 20%
Income -0.019 -0.530*** -1.582*** -2.140*** -2.233***
(0.13) (0.16) (0.21) (0.18) (0.10)
Location shift 0.053 0.567*** 1.608*** 2.148*** 2.223***
(0.14) (0.16) (0.21) (0.18) (0.10)
τY : 30%
Income -0.008 -0.394*** -1.187*** -1.613*** -1.685***
(0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07)
Location shift 0.041 0.430*** 1.213*** 1.621*** 1.675***
(0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07)
τY : 50%
Income -0.001 -0.323*** -0.990*** -1.352*** -1.412***
(0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07)
Location shift 0.033 0.358*** 1.015*** 1.359*** 1.402***
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07)
τY : 70%
Income 0.000 -0.275*** -0.852*** -1.166*** -1.218***
(0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05)
Location shift 0.031 0.308*** 0.874*** 1.172*** 1.209***
(0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05)
τY : 80%
Income -0.002 -0.266*** -0.828*** -1.129*** -1.181***
(0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
Location shift 0.033 0.298*** 0.849*** 1.135*** 1.173***
(0.12) (0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 14: Structural quantile treatment effects.
Compulsory education including kindergarten.
Ind. variable: Quantiles Educational Transfers In-kind
τK : 20% τK : 30% τK : 50% τK : 70% τK : 80%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τY : 20%
FB1 -0.007 0.165** 0.500*** 0.635*** 0.687***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
FB2 0.022 0.303*** 0.862*** 1.203*** 1.235***
(0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.07)
τY : 30%
FB1 -0.009 0.150** 0.460*** 0.581*** 0.630***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
FB2 0.013 0.204*** 0.573*** 0.819*** 0.837***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
τY : 50%
FB1 -0.002 0.249*** 0.735*** 0.954*** 1.015***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
FB2 0.014 0.197** 0.563*** 0.805*** 0.820***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06)
τY : 70%
FB1 -0.001 0.232** 0.683*** 0.881*** 0.941***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
FB2 0.008 0.124* 0.360*** 0.537*** 0.542***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
τY : 80%
FB1 -0.006 0.193** 0.576*** 0.736*** 0.792***
(0.10) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07)
FB2 0.011 0.125* 0.363*** 0.541*** 0.547***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 15: Homogeneity tests.
Panel (a): 20th and 80th quantiles of K, given τY
τY : 20% τY : 30% τY : 50% τY : 70% τY : 80%
2.211*** 1.676*** 1.410*** 1.220*** 1.181***
(0.16) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.13)
Panel (b): 20th and 80th quantiles of Y, given τK
τK : 20% τK : 30% τK : 50% τK : 70% τK : 80%
-0.017 -0.264 -0.755*** -1.011*** -1.052***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.22) (0.18) (0.11)
Note: The Table reports the homogeneity tests of marginal quantile treatment effects of income, compulsory
education including kindergarten. Panel (a) displays the difference between the marginal income effects
estimated at the 20th and the 80th quantiles of educational transfers in-kind distribution, fixing quantiles
of the household income capacity. Panel (b) displays instead the difference between the marginal income
effects estimated at the 20th and the 80th quantiles of the household income capacity, fixing quantiles of
the educational transfers in-kind distribution. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 16: Structural quantile treatment effects: tertiary education.
Ind. variable: Quantiles Educational Transfers In-kind
τK : 20% τK : 30% τK : 50% τK : 70% τK : 80%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τY : 20%
Income 0.049 0.153** 0.217*** 0.286*** 0.339***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08)
Location shift -0.024 -0.149** -0.205*** -0.279*** -0.332***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
τY : 30%
Income 0.041 0.152** 0.215*** 0.286*** 0.338***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Location shift -0.017 -0.150** -0.205*** -0.281*** -0.337***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
τY : 50%
Income 0.031 0.127** 0.189*** 0.252*** 0.311***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Location shift -0.010 -0.127** -0.180*** -0.248*** -0.314***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
τY : 70%
Income 0.023 0.090** 0.142*** 0.185*** 0.234***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Location shift -0.007 -0.094** -0.140*** -0.185*** -0.237***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
τY : 80%
Income 0.021 0.088** 0.146*** 0.193*** 0.245***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Location shift -0.005 -0.093** -0.146*** -0.195*** -0.250***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 17: Structural quantile treatment effects: tertiary education.
Ind. variable: Quantiles Educational Transfers In-kind
τK : 20% τK : 30% τK : 50% τK : 70% τK : 80%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τY : 20%
FB1 -0.102 -0.213** -0.232*** -0.305*** -0.390***
(0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
FB2 0.151* 0.077 0.003 -0.042 -0.038
(0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09)
τY : 30%
FB1 -0.095 -0.236** -0.266*** -0.352*** -0.443***
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
FB2 0.154** 0.101 0.035 0.005 0.020
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08)
τY : 50%
FB1 -0.082 -0.197** -0.220** -0.290*** -0.374***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
FB2 0.151** 0.096 0.025 -0.010 -0.012
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
τY : 70%
FB1 -0.070 -0.149* -0.160** -0.199** -0.256***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
FB2 0.148* 0.092 0.018 -0.014 -0.021
(0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08)
τY : 80%
FB1 -0.074 -0.174* -0.208*** -0.262*** -0.335***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
FB2 0.152** 0.119 0.059 0.040 0.043
(0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 18: Homogeneity tests.
Panel (a): 20th and 80th quantiles of K, given τY
τY : 20% τY : 30% τY : 50% τY : 70% τY : 80%
-0.291*** -0.299*** -0.280*** -0.209*** -0.220***
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Panel (b): 20th and 80th quantiles of Y, given τK
τK : 20% τK : 30% τK : 50% τK : 70% τK : 80%
0.027 0.064 0.071 0.093 0.097
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09)
Note: The Table reports the homogeneity tests of marginal quantile treatment effects of income, tertiary
education. Panel (a) displays the difference between the marginal income effects estimated at the 20th and
the 80th quantiles of educational transfers in-kind distribution, fixing quantiles of the household income
capacity. Panel (b) displays instead the difference between the marginal income effects estimated at the
20th and the 80th quantiles of the household income capacity, fixing quantiles of the educational transfers
in-kind distribution. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 19: Structural quantile treatment effects: post compulsory education.
Ind. variable: Quantiles Educational Transfers In-kind
τK : 20% τK : 30% τK : 50% τK : 70% τK : 80%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τY : 20%
Income 0.244** 0.365*** 0.310*** 0.008 -0.109
(0.10) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.11)
Location shift -0.222** -0.360*** -0.319*** -0.031 0.075
(0.11) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.12)
τY : 30%
Income 0.210*** 0.305*** 0.265*** 0.004 -0.098
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Location shift -0.194** -0.302*** -0.274*** -0.028 0.065
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
τY : 50%
Income 0.210*** 0.278*** 0.248*** 0.006 -0.092
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08)
Location shift -0.199** -0.277*** -0.257*** -0.030 0.061
(0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09)
τY : 70%
Income 0.151*** 0.192*** 0.168*** 0.002 -0.067
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Location shift -0.147*** -0.192*** -0.178*** -0.026 0.039
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
τY : 80%
Income 0.147*** 0.192*** 0.166*** 0.003 -0.065
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Location shift -0.143** -0.193*** -0.176*** -0.025 0.036
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 20: Structural quantile treatment effects: post compulsory education.
Ind. variable: Quantiles Educational Transfers In-kind
τK : 20% τK : 30% τK : 50% τK : 70% τK : 80%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τY : 20%
FB1 -0.111 -0.222*** -0.175*** -0.012 0.081
(0.10) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08)
FB2 -0.045 -0.050 -0.056 0.043 0.060
(0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
τY : 30%
FB1 -0.122 -0.256*** -0.210*** -0.016 0.091
(0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
FB2 -0.030 -0.010 -0.023 0.047 0.053
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
τY : 50%
FB1 -0.138 -0.252*** -0.211*** -0.019 0.091
(0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09)
FB2 -0.046 -0.034 -0.046 0.046 0.061
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
τY : 70%
FB1 -0.094 -0.172** -0.137*** -0.015 0.069
(0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
FB2 -0.047 -0.040 -0.050 0.043 0.063
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
τY : 80%
FB1 -0.092 -0.183*** -0.140*** -0.015 0.070
(0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
FB2 -0.044 -0.031 -0.043 0.043 0.064
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 21: Homogeneity tests.
Panel (a): 20th and 80th quantiles of K, given τY
τY : 20% τY : 30% τY : 50% τY : 70% τY : 80%
0.346*** 0.304*** 0.301*** 0.219*** 0.214***
(0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07)
Panel (b): 20th and 80th quantiles of Y, given τK
τK : 20% τK : 30% τK : 50% τK : 70% τK : 80%
0.095 0.173* 0.143* 0.005 -0.044
(0.12) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.12)
Note: The Table reports the homogeneity tests of marginal quantile treatment effects of income, post-
compulsory education. Panel (a) displays the difference between the marginal income effects estimated
at the 20th and the 80th quantiles of educational transfers in-kind distribution, fixing quantiles of the
household income capacity. Panel (b) displays instead the difference between the marginal income effects
estimated at the 20th and the 80th quantiles of the household income capacity, fixing quantiles of the
educational transfers in-kind distribution. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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